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CASE COMMENTS

CASE COMMENTS
RETRACTION STATUTES:
A CHANGE IN THE LAW OF LIBEL
Historically, the publication of a libel was actionable without
pleading and proving any special damages.'Injury to the plaintiff's
reputation was presumed, and so he could recover general damages.
Three types of damages may be involved in a libel action: general,
special, and punitive. The major elements of general damages are
injury to reputation, 2 loss of business, 3 bodily injury and wounded
feelings. 4 Special damages, on the other hand, can only be recovered
when the injury is a direct pecuniary or material one. 5 Proof'of special
damage is extremely difficult, and American decisions sustaining such
claims are few.6 Finally, if the evidence shows that the defendant was
wanton or malicious, punitive damages are recoverable in addition
to damages given for compensation.7 The theory of awarding punitive
damages is that they are imposed on the defendant as a penalty. At
common law, publication of a retraction would defeat a claim for
punitive damages but served only to decrease the amount of general
damages recoverable by the defamed party.8
The common law of libel has been often criticized, 9 particularly
in the area of unintentional defamation where seemingly excessive
damages have sometimes been recovered from responsible publishers.
This dissatisfaction resulted in the sporadic enactment of statutes
'Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812). Mansfield
stated in this case he that could see no valid reason for distinguishing slander
from written defamation but was bound by a long established precedent.
'Craney v. Donovan, 92 Conn. 236, 102 At. 640 (1917).
8
Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 113 Va. 156, 73 S.E. 472 (1912).
'Pion v. Caron, 237 Mass. io7, x29 N.E. 369 (1921).
5
McCormick, Damages § 114 (1935).
6
The courts generally require the defamed party to plead and prove the character of the acts which have-caused the damage with a greater degree of definiteness
than is normally required in pleading damages. McCormick, Damages § 115 (1935).
The same conditions are required in England as well. "As much certainty and
particularity must be insisted on, both in pleading and proof of damage, as
is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances and to the nature of the acts
themselves by which the damage is done." Ratcliff v. Evans, [18921 2 Q.B. 524,
532 (C.A.).
WMcCormick, Damages § i18 (1935).
Meyerle v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 45 N.D. 568, 178 N.W. 792 (1920).
"See Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 891 (1956).
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limiting the recovery of general damages where the publisher of the
libel has published or offered to publish a retraction. 10 Legislatures
enacting such statutes consider retraction to be the same as exculpation and, therefore, this alleviates the need for general damages.
Proponents of the retraction statutes contend that "exculpation in
the eyes of the world is not accomplished by quiet entry of judgment
on musty court rolls."" The strong desire to disseminate news rapidly
in a world of nearly instantaneous communication will necessarily
result in some unavoidable mistakes. Though there is no exact statistical information available, it is believed that responsible news media
readily retract any false statements which are published. By providing
for retraction in lieu of general damages, publishers are relieved of the
danger of excessive verdicts and extortion by unscrupulous plaintiffs.
However, numerous writers are somewhat critical of the various retraction statutes.' 2 They believe that retraction is never an entirely
adequate remedy, for rarely does a retraction reach all who heard
the defamation. Even though retraction often may be a sufficient
remedy in the case of an inadvertent libel, there seems to be no justification for allowing publication of a retraction to relieve a malicious
13
defendant.
The Supreme Court of Oregon in Holden v. PioneerBroadcasting
Co.14 applied a retraction statute 5 that radically changes the common
law of libel. Under the Oregon statute the plaintiff may recover such
special damages as he can prove to have suffered as a result of the
defamatory statement, but general damages are not recoverable unless
a correction or retraction was demanded and refused, or the plaintiff
proves that the defendant actually intended to defame him.
"For a comprehensive compilation of American retraction statutes see Leflar,
Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 423, 436-40 (1952).
"Morris, Torts 294 (1953).
'See for instance Chafee, Possible New Remedies for Errors in the Press, 6o
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1946); Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction,
32 Ill. L. Rev. 36 (1936); Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 944 (1956).
'3 See 38 Calif. L. Rev. 951 (195o).
"356 P.2d 845 (Ore. 1961). The defendant's primary ground of attack was
on the constitutionality of the Oregon statute. In Holden the Statute was upheld
by a 4-3 decision. This constitutional attack has long been a serious deterrent to
the adoption of strong retraction statutes. A statute eliminating the recovery of
general damages by a defamed party runs the risk of depriving him of property
without due process of law. This subject is developed at great length in Morris,
Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 Ill. L. Rev. 36 (1937). In addition
see 23 So. Cal. L. Rev. 89 ('949); 36 Ore. L. Rev. 70 (956); 38 Calif. L. Rev. 951,

954 (195o).
"Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 30.155-30.175 (1955).
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In Holden the plaintiff sued to recover special, general and punitive damages for a libelous statement made by the defendants during a television broadcast. On motion of the defendants, the court
struck the claims for general and punitive damages on the ground that
the complaint did not allege that the defendants either intended to
defame the plaintiff or refused to publish a retraction. In affirming,
the Supreme Court said the Oregon statite requires "the plaintiff
to plead and prove, as a condition precedent to recovery, defendants
intent to defame or in the absence of such intent, the failure to retract upon demand."'16
Though this decision represents a great change in the law of libel,
it does not come without warning. As previously indicated, some state
legislatures have sought to protect news media that retract defamatory
releases from excessive verdicts. However, these efforts have been
met with great hostility from the courts, for most of these retraction
statutes have been held unconstitutional 17 or have been judicially
construed so as to leave the common law virtually unchanged.18 Retraction statutes may be divided into two categories: One group uses
vague language that is susceptible of varying construction, while the
other group expressly precludes the recovery of general damages.
A statute in the first group may read that the plaintiff shall recover only "actual damage" in the event of a retraction or an offer
of the same. Most courts reviewing such a statute have construed
"actual damage" to -include both general and special damages.' 9 Such
a judicial construction leaves the common law unchanged, with the
result, as Professor Morris says, that "the sum total of significant
changes in the measure of damages when inadvertent libel has been
20
retracted is zero."
At least three states2 ' have enacted statutes in the second group,
u365 P.2d at 847.
"E.g., Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 67o, 75 Pac. 1041 (19o4); Park v. Detroit
Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888).
"Ellis v. Brockton Pub. Co., 198 Mass. 538, 84 N.E. ioi8 (19o8); Osborn v.
Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 81, (1904).
1
2Comer v. Age-Herald Pub. Co., 151 Ala. 613, 44 So. 673 (1907) (actual equals
general damage); Ross v. Gbre, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950) (actual damages equal
general damages);Ellis v. Brockton Pub. Co., 198 Mass. 538, 84 N.E. io18 (19o8) (actual damages equal general damages); Meyerle v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 45 N.D. 568,
178 N.W. 792 (192o). In Neafie v. Hoboken Printing and Pub. Co., 75 N.J.L. 564,
68 At. 146 (1907), the statute was construed to exclude the recovery of punitive
damages only.
"Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 Il1. L. Rev. 36, 42
(1932).
2The three states with more stringent retraction statutes which have been
upheld in the face of constitutional attack are California, Minnesota, and Oregon.
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expressly excluding general damages in the event of a retraction or
an offer of retraction. These statutes do not admit of a judicial construction that permits the recovery of general damages. Although this
latter group of statutes does preclude the recovery of general damages
in the event of a retraction, there is a wide divergence of opinion as
to how far this protection should carry.
Under the Minnesota statute general damages are not recoverable
where there is a showing of good faith coupled with a full retraction
by the defendant.22 However, in Allen v. PioneerPress Co.23 this good
faith requirement was construed to include freedom from negligence as
well as freedom from an improper motive. Thus the scope of this
statute has been limited by the judiciary so that there is little change
from the common law.
The California statute 24 is at the other extreme from the Minnesota act. This statute, which was applied in Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers,25 allows a retraction as a defense to
recovery of general damages even in the case of a deliberate and malicious libel. By limiting the plaintiff's recovery to special damages
for a malicious publication, the legislature seems to have granted a
license to defame, tacitly encouraging sensationalism in the press.
The Oregon statute occupies the median position between the
milder Minnesota statute and the more severe California legislation.
The Oregon statute has many of the good features of the other two
acts and yet omits the more objectionable aspects of each. It goes
further in changing the common law of libel than does the Minnesota
act, but it does not offer the more drastic protection to malicious publishers provided in the California statute.
Even at common law, proof of retraction generally precluded the
recovery of punitive damages.2 6 Consistent with this rule, most of the
retraction statutes are interpreted as precluding the recovery of punitive damages. The Oregon retraction statute does not mention punitive damages and the court in Holden specifically declined to make a
determination on that issue.2 7 It only held that the allegations of the
plaintiff's complaint were not sufficient to charge the defendants
with an intent to defame.
Though the various retraction statutes have not met with great
UMinn.

Stat. Ann. § 548.o6 (1947).

."4o Minn. 117, 41 N.W. 936 (1889).
mCal. Civ. Code § 48(a).
'35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950).
26Prosser, Torts § 96 (955).
2365 P.2d at 851.

